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14. The Explanatory Power 
of Radical Behaviorism*
HUGH LACEY AND BARRY SCHWARTZ
B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorist program has always been bold, distinctive, 
significant, and far-reaching. It has also been controversial, for it has involved 
commitments to the following views.
1 All human behavior is lawful. It is explicable in terms of principles (laws, 
regularities, generalizations) that can be discovered and confirmed in 
experimental studies in the laboratory.
2 For the bulk of human behavior, including verbal and purposive behavior, 
these generalizations involve only current relations between behaviors 
and environmental factors, together with a person’s past history of such 
relations. Other variables, whether from physiology or from cognitive 
psychology, are not needed to express these generalizations (see Skinner, 
1945, for qualifications of this view).
3 In the light of these generalizations significant controls may be exerted 
over human behavior, controls that, as they are progressively imple­
mented, promise to resolve major social problems.
4 The achievement of widespread control, both experimental and technolo­
gical, is a crucial factor, alongside prediction, in evaluating the explana­
tory claims of a research program.
Skinner recognized that these commitments presuppose a particular view of 
the human person. He summed it up in these words: ‘A person is not an 
originating agent; he is a locus, a point at which many genetic and environmental 
variables come together in a joint effort’ (Skinner, 1974, p. 168). Acknowledging 
this view led him to propose a fundamental revision of our discourse about human
* This paper was prepared with the help of National Science Foundation grants SES-838604 (to HL) 
and BNS82-06670 (to BS).
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persons and societal relations, a revision that challenges the assumptions that 
maintain liberal social and political institutions, and indeed the way we think 
about moral and political issues in general. This chapter is motivated by the 
question: is there sufficient support, either theoretical or empirical, for Skinner’s 
commitments for one to take his views as a serious guide to action? We will be 
concerned principally with evaluating the comprehensiveness of the explanatory 
power of radical behaviorist principles.
EVALUATING COMPREHENSIVENESS
How, then, can the comprehensiveness of behavior principles be assessed? Many 
refuse to address this question, regarding it as nothing more than distracting 
speculation, incapable of serious answer until the radical behaviorist research 
program is much further along. Indeed some become impatient even with Skinner 
himself when he draws out far-reaching, and thus far unsupported, implications of 
radical behaviorism. They perceive that such speculation provides an easy target 
for criticism, while doing little to further the science of behavior. Therefore, 
before we present our main argument about how comprehensive radical behavior­
ist principles are, a little needs to be said about why an assessment of comprehen­
siveness is important, even, or perhaps especially, at this stage of scientific 
development. There are at least three important reasons for assessing comprehen­
siveness. They apply to any research program, in any science.
1 A research program (Lakatos, 1978; see Lacey, 1980, for application to 
behaviorism) provides positive guidelines for research, in large part by 
constraining what constitutes proper research — what are proper 
methods, research strategies, and hypotheses. It can be said to be defined 
by an object of inquiry (e.g., behavior), and by a broadly sketched class 
of parameters whose effects it systematically and progressively investi­
gates to include more, more complex, and more significant features of the 
object of inquiry within its explanatory compass. It provisionally assumes 
that the class of parameters it investigates is broad enough to encompass 
the object of inquiry. Without a preliminary charting of the general, 
fundamental features of the object"of inquiry, and a plausibility argument 
that the parameters in question could fully explain it, there is no ground 
for restricting inquiry in the manner required by the research program. 
General methodological arguments, dissociated from the specific object of 
inquiry, cannot provide such a ground (see Lacey, 1974). Thus, for 
example, the study of behavioral and environmental parameters, and not 
of cognitive ones, requires a substantive and not just a methodological 
defense.
2 As Skinner (1971) makes clear, there is a contradiction between the 
conception of human behavior that informs the behaviorist research prog­
ram and that which informs dominant social practices. If the latter con­
ception is correct, the behaviorist program cannot produce a comprehen­
sive explanatory account of behavior. Alternatively, if the behaviorist 
conception is correct, and if it were to become widely accepted, social 
practices justified by the other conception would be undermined and
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displaced. There is no room for compromise here: either the behaviorist 
program is importantly incomplete, or important social practices are ill- 
conceived. If the research program is incomplete, sound research must 
extend beyond it to those features of behavior that cannot be encompas­
sed by the program. In order to uphold any claim to the priority of the 
behaviorist program then, a strong plausibility argument supporting its 
comprehensiveness is essential.
3 Behaviorists tend to pursue vigorously the application of their discoveries, 
and for many application constitutes the principal rationale of ex­
perimental inquiry. An application is licit only if two conditions are met: 
first, that it succeeds in bringing about the desired effect; and second, that 
it does not produce any undesired side-effects. Experiment can settle the 
first condition. To settle the second, one needs to explore the range of 
variables on which the applied procedure could have an impact. Suppose, 
for example, that it is true that behavior is almost exclusively controlled 
by prevailing contingencies of reinforcement coupled with the organism’s 
past history of reinforcement. If so, one need not look beyond the scope 
of behaviorism to check for side-effects, and we could reasonably expect 
that a procedure that merely recasts the prevailing contingencies would 
not produce adverse effects on human beings. But our expectancy would 
be different if important behaviors were not explicable in terms of be­
havioral principles, but instead required, let us say, an appeal to princi­
ples of cognitive psychology. Then, achieving control through an applied 
procedure could well involve the modification of cognitive factors that 
behavioral principles do not encompass though they may be of central 
human significance. An example of this sort of side-effect is Schwartz s 
(1982) demonstration that a history of reinforcement for successful indi­
vidual responses impaired people’s ability to discover generalizations 
efficiently. Since applied behavior analysts rarely evaluate the licitness of 
applications in the light of the posits of rival research programs, or the 
presuppositions that underlie dominant social practices, it follows that 
their presumption of the licitness of routine application of behavioral 
principles rests upon a positive assessment of the comprehensiveness of 
the behaviorist program (see Lacey, 1979).
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IS BEHAVIORISM COMPREHENSIVE?
Now that it is clear that an assessment of behaviorism’s comprehensiveness is 
important, it is time to make the assessment. Skinner has maintained that his 
commitment to comprehensiveness is required if one adopts a scientific stance 
towards human beings. Certainly, its apparent plausibility is supported by the 
success of radical behaviorism’s scientific research program. It has now been 
demonstrated in countless experiments that there are principles of the type cited 
by Skinner, and the range of their manifest exemplification continues to expand 
(see Schwartz, 1984, for a review). Equally important has been the success of 
applied behavior analysis, the application of experimentally derived principles to 
generate control in certain institutions and social contexts.
However, these successes do not tell us how comprehensive radical behavior-
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ist principles are. That is because experimental and applied settings, those in 
which the explanatory power of behavioral principles is clear, have significant 
characteristics that are lacking in a large and important class of ordinary social 
settings. They tend to be relatively simple, with few salient variables operating. 
They are constructed by some human beings to satisfy certain explicit ends, ends 
that involve the successful control of other human beings (or experimental ani­
mals). How comprehensive behavior principles are cannot be settled only by 
investigation of experimental and applied settings, just as the comprehensiveness 
of the physics of motion is not settled by the study of objects in a vacuum, or by 
the construction of cannons. We believe that there are clear limits to the compre­
hensiveness of behavior principles, and we now turn to the kind of argument that 
can support this negative assessment. The issue is difficult and complex; it is the 
kind of issue where a missing of the minds frequently occurs. The reason for this 
is that we are not asking whether behavior principles currently are comprehen­
sive. On this there is virtually no disagreement; everyone acknowledges that there 
is still much work to be done. Rather, what we are asking, and answering 
negatively, is whether behavior principles are in principle comprehensive. To 
show that behavior principles cannot produce a comprehensive account of be­
havior, we must show that there are behaviors that principles consistent with the 
constraints of the research program cannot explain. How can this be done?
There is both constancy and change as a research program unfolds. Its 
conception of the object of inquiry and of the parameters worthy of investigation 
remains more or less constant. The behaviorist commitment to behavior as the 
object of inquiry, and to certain current and past environmental factors as para­
meters, is an example of this constancy. While this formulation of the constraints 
of the research program is quite general, it does conflict with other conceptions, 
for example, that verbal and purposive behavior are expressions of mental events. 
While what should be studied is not logically entailed by the behaviorist concep­
tion, it does set limits. Reinforcement, punishment, discriminative control, etc. 
can be studied; mental states cannot. The research program imposes constraints; 
it rules out some things.
On the other hand, the appropriate, specific set of parameters can change. It 
can expand, as when Skinner added the domain of operant to that of respondent 
conditioning. Or it can be transformed in a more fundamental way, as in recent 
attempts to incorporate behavioral principles into the broad framework provided 
by micro-economic theory (e.g., Rachlin et al. 1976). Such attempts should be 
viewed as progressive developments of the behaviorist research program, rather 
than as the introduction of a rival, because (1) the parameters employed in the 
economic model all fit the radical behaviorist constraints; (2) the economic model 
retains previously established behavioral principles as special cases, not as ad hoc 
additions; (3) it has expanded the range of phenomena of which behavioral 
principles offer explicit and detailed explanations; and (4) it opens up new, 
potentially fruitful areas of research. Given the possibility of this kind of trans­
forming change within the behaviorist program, it is even more important to 
emphasize that any argument for the limits of behaviorist explanation must be 
applicable to the general conceptions that define the program, and not merely to 
the specific set of principles currently known.
We expect a serious argument for the inherently restricted explanatory power 
of the radical behaviorist research program to spring not from a formal proof that
The Explanatory Power of Radical Behaviorism
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behaviorist principles must be inconsistent with certain data, but from the positive 
achievements of an alternative scheme. The relevant positive achievements would 
be the following.
1 The alternative offers explicit and detailed explanations of a certain class 
of phenomena.
2 These explanations employ parameters that violate the constraints of the 
behaviorist program.
3 These explanations have some empirical support.
4 Behavioral principles currently offer no explanation of this class of phe­
nomena.5 The class of phenomena that the alternative scheme explains consists of 
behavior that is reasonably regarded as characteristically human.
6 The alternative scheme is fruitful, either with respect to defining and 
solving research problems, or with respect to providing an aid to practical 
concerns.
7 The alternative scheme produces the current behavioral principles as 
special cases, obtained when either one or more specified variables are 
held constant, or under special, explicitly stated, environmental condi­
tions.
8 The presuppositions or theoretical principles of the alternative scheme 
imply that there exist regularities relating behavior to environmental 
factors, past and present, only in settings in which specified variables are 
held constant or in which specified environmental conditions obtain.
9 Repeated efforts to extend the behaviorist research program, as a gen­
erator of fruitful research, to settings in which the specified variables are 
not held constant, or specified environmental conditions do not obtain, 
have failed.
We regard the demonstration of this list of achievements by an alternative 
scheme to behaviorism as necessary and sufficient to show that behaviorism is 
inherently incomplete. Moreover, such achievements would also serve to define 
positively the limits of behaviorist explanation, by specifying which variables had 
to be held constant, or which environmental conditions had to exist, for behavior­
al principles to provide a satisfactory explanation of behavior. The production of 
such an alternative scheme would not logically compel the rejection of behavior­
ism. However, it is not easy to see what grounds could be used to defend 
continued allegiance to behaviorism. One could not appeal to comprehensiveness 
since, in the stipulated circumstances, behaviorism has been shown not to be as 
comprehensive as the alternative. One could not appeal to fruitfulness since, 
again by stipulation, there is at least one significant domain in which the alterna­
tive scheme is more fruitful. And one could not appeal to the power to control 
behavior that behavior principles yield since, once more by stipulation, that 
power is restricted to a specified set of situations.
Hugh Lacey and Barry Schwartz
AN ALTERNATIVE TO BEHAVIORISM
A suitable alternative to behaviorism could, in principle, come from either of two 
sources. It could come from a rival scientific research program, such as cognitive
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psychology. Or it could come from an explanatory scheme whose origins lie in 
practical life rather than experimental research, such as that of teleological 
explanation (Taylor, 1964). Whether or not they actually meet our stringent 
requirements, it is fair to construe the critical arguments against behaviorism by 
Chomsky (1959) and Fodor (1975) as attempts to provide an alternative scheme 
from psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology. This is certainly a proper source 
of an alternative to behaviorism if one shares with behaviorism the commonplace 
scientific presupposition that behavior is lawful. We will not here evaluate argu­
ments that spring from rival scientific research programs.
Instead, we will point to the limits of behaviorist explanation from the 
perspective of the explanatory framework universally used in the deliberations of 
practical life — that of teleological explanation. Let us begin by acknowledging 
that behaviorist principles are manifestly exemplified in settings (both ex­
perimental and applied) in which control is established. These settings exhibit the 
following characteristics: only a few reinforcers are available, and usually one has 
special salience; the experimenter (behavior modifier) has control over conditions 
of deprivation and access to the reinforcers; there is only one, or at most a few, 
available means to the reinforcers; the performance of clearly defined, specific 
tasks is reinforced; different tasks are effectively interchangeable for the one that 
is reinforced; the schedule of reinforcement is externally imposed and varied by 
agents not themselves being subjected to the contingencies; there are no effective 
alternatives to being in the setting.
We will call settings that exhibit these characteristics closed settings. Clearly, 
settings can be more or less closed. The argument that follows suggests that the 
exemplification of behavior principles should become increasingly discernible as 
the setting becomes increasingly closed. Demonstrating that behaviorism has 
explanatory success in closed settings does not suffice to show that its explanatory 
principles are comprehensive, if not alt settings are closed. And many ordinary 
social settings are not. We now sketch an argument, the details of which can be 
found elsewhere (Schwartz and Lacey, 1982, Ch. 9; Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and 
Lacey, 1978) that the explanatory power of behaviorism is limited to closed 
settings. The argument is empirical in character, though primarily based on 
sociological and historical rather than experimental considerations.
Experimental and applied settings are closed, and they were constructed by 
behavioral psychologists in order that control be obtained in them. As a step 
toward exploring the possible exemplification of behavioral principles in open 
(that is, non-closed) settings, we asked if they are manifestly exemplified in any 
setting of our society that was not constructed in the course of applying known 
behavioral principles. There is one such setting, parts of the modern, factory 
workplace. If this setting were paradigmatic of social settings in general, we would 
be well on the way to defending the comprehensiveness of behaviorism. But it is 
not, for two reasons. First, while this setting is ubiquitous in the modern world 
(decreasingly so in the first world, increasingly so in the third), there are impor­
tant courses of action (for example, creating and running the factory, or engaging 
in science) that are not encompassed by it. That is, behaviorists may be able to 
account for the person’s behavior within the closed setting, but they cannot 
account for their own behavior in establishing it. Second, this setting, as a 
significant social phenomenon, is a recent historical development, and is wide-
The Explanatory Power of Radical Behaviorism
Hugh Lacey and Barry Schwartz 171
spread only in industrial societies. We reached this second conclusion on the basis 
of the following observations (Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and Lacey, 1978).
1 Medieval work, the precursor to modern work, cannot be analyzed as 
exemplifying behavioral principles, because it was variegated, flexible, 
and socially integrated.
2 Important features of the modern factory workplace emerged slowly 
during the nineteenth century. As they emerged, certain customary and 
traditional work practices were suppressed and gradually replaced by 
wages as the worker’s predominant concern in the workplace.
3 Only with the suppression of these traditional practices did behavior in 
the workplace become describable and explicable in informative detail in 
terms of behavioral principles.
4 The structuring of the modern workplace was completed under the heavy 
influence of the scientific management movement at the turn of this 
century, in the light of principles virtually identical to those of behavior­
ism.
We conclude from these observations that those settings in which behavioral 
principles are manifestly exemplified are not generally characteristic of human 
societies, but have been constructed in the course of recent history. Moreover, 
although they are not the product of applied behavior analysis as we know it 
today, they are also closed settings, in which money is the salient reinforcer. The 
factory workplace, then, does not constitute evidence that behavioral principles 
are exemplified outside closed settings. That this is so is bolstered by the fact that 
as one moves to more open settings, in which external control is minimized, 
desired outcomes are the product of lengthy, variegated, and often novel activi­
ties, and plans and actions are shaped in the course of study and discussion, 
behaviorist descriptive categories become less and less useful for providing illumi­
nating descriptions. Instead they become more metaphorical, more parasitic on 
other conceptual schemes, and more dependent upon appeals to the complex or 
unknown. A striking example of this is how ‘reinforcement’ tends to take on a 
vague, metaphorical usage, marred by an oft-repeated conceptual confusion.
Radical behaviorists often assert that their fundamental principle is; ‘be­
havior is under the control of its consequences’, which they usually take to be 
equivalent to: ‘behavior is under the control of contingencies of reinforcement.’ 
Thus, any consequence that controls behavior necessarily becomes a reinforcer, 
from which it is often inferred that any goal of a human action is a reinforcer. 
Since behavior in most open settings is goal-directed, that is, is performed in 
order to bring about certain consequences, the inference would imply that this 
open-setting, goal-directed behavior is controlled by reinforcement. In order to 
see that this inference is invalid, note that within behavior theory, ‘behavior is 
under the control of contingencies of reinforcement’ has the very precise mean­
ing: ‘behavior occurs because of the contingencies of reinforcement in which 
earlier instances of the behavior have been involved.’ But behavior may occur in 
order to bring about a certain consequence without previous instances of the same 
kind of behavior ever having been reinforced, or even having occurred. The 
invention of the ‘Skinner box’, for the convenient study of free-operant behavior, 
and of concurrent reinforcement schedules, for the convenient study of choice.
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and of ‘mands’ and ‘tacts’ for the analysis of verbal behavior are just a few 
examples. Also, within behavior theory something is a reinforcer only if it in­
creases the probability of the behaviors on which it is contingent. But there are 
many goals for which a person may act that do not have this property, goals that, 
once achieved, render irrelevant or unnecessary the further repetition of the 
behaviors that eventuated in the achievement of the goals. For example, once 
Skinner and his collaborators reached the goal of having discovered generaliza­
tions about schedules of reinforcement, they moved to other experimental in­
quiries. Such goals are not reinforcers.
We have concluded that there is no evidence that behavioral principles are 
exemplified outside closed settings, and that in open settings, radical behaviorism 
offers neither explanations nor illuminating descriptions. For completeness, our 
argument would require demonstrating the inadequacy of Skinner’s ‘interpreta­
tions’ of verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957), but we lack the space to do so here (see 
Lacey, 1974). In contrast, teleological categories (goal, expectancy, plan, reason, 
intention, etc.) are routinely successful in capturing order in human action, and m 
expressing the detail, sequence, novelty, and significant variation that human 
behavior displays. They are used in historical inquiry and social commentary, and 
universally in charting the human environment as an apt guide to action. The 
framework of teleology satisfies all the criteria we identified earlier that a serious 
alternative to behaviorism would have to meet.
1 It offers explicit and detailed explanations of a certain class of phenomena 
 goal-directed behaviors in open settings.
2 These explanations employ parameters (intention, purpose, deliberation, 
etc.) that violate the constraints of the behaviorist program.
3 These explanations have empirical support; we use them effectively to 
make sense of most aspects of daily life.
4 Behavioral principles currently offer no explanation of this class of phe­
nomena, as we have argued above.
5 The phenomena that the teleological framework explains are characteris­
tically human. ...
6 The teleological framework is fruitful; it provides the categories that en­
able effective interaction and deliberation in practical life.
7 It treats current behavioral principles as special cases, generalizations that 
obtain when, and only when, the conditions defining closed settings 
obtain. In these settings behavior is still purposive; that it exhibits law-hke 
regularities is a consequence of the limited options and means to bring 
them about that characterize closed settings. Behavior in these settings is 
a special, albeit in our historical epoch, common case. Put another way, 
goals become reinforcers only under the conditions of closed settings, and 
behavioral principles are exemplified only when key conditions that pre­
vail in open settings are suppressed.
8 More generally, the presuppositions of teleological explanation (see be­
low) imply that there exist regularities relating behavior to environmental 
factors, past and present, only when environmental conditions are held 
sufficiently constant that intelligent variation of goals is not likely to 
occur.
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9 Repeated efforts to extend the behaviorist research program to open 
settings have failed.
We want to emphasize that while behavioral phenomena in open settings are 
more complex than those in closed settings, complexity is not the key to our 
argument. Closed settings are not the simplest cases on which to build additively 
in order eventually to encompass complex, open cases, which is what most 
behaviorist researchers assume. Rather, they are special, degenerate cases that 
are properly intelligible only in the light of the teleological categories that also 
illuminate open settings.
The logic of teleological explanations is quite distinct from the logic of 
explanations obtained by subsuming a phenomenon under general laws, a goal to 
which all behaviorist explanations aspire (see Taylor, 1964). When we say, "A had 
the goal X, and A did Y because A believed that doing Y would (contribute to) 
bring about W’, we do not imply that there are internal states, ^’s having goals 
and beliefs, that are instances of variables in a law that subsumes ^’s doing X. 
Thus, for example, the explanatory import of ‘in the 1950s, Skinner engaged in a 
sustained, collaborative program of experimentation systematically investigating 
schedules of reinforcement, because his goal was to formulate a comprehensive 
set of behavioral principles, and he believed that reinforcement schedules were 
significant variables in that set, and that his available experimental techniques 
could uncover the principles of reinforcement schedules’ does not depend upon 
finding laws (regularities, generalizations) linking those goals and beliefs to the 
sequence of actions that constituted the carrying out of the research program. The 
having of goals and beliefs is not a hypothesized internal state that has a causal 
role that is explicated by laws. Rather, the connection between the having of 
goals and beliefs and action is closer to a logical relation, expressed in what some 
philosophers have called a ‘practical syllogism’. The idea (considerably simplified) 
is this: if I say that I have the goal X and that I believe that doing Y will bring 
about X, but yet I don’t do Y, then I am involved in a ‘practical contradiction’, 
unless I can show that there were countervailing considerations (for example, 
another goal that overrode X, another means to X, that I was prevented forcibly 
from doing Y). Put another way, certeris paribus not doing Y is public evidence 
that either I did not have the goal or I did not have the belief. This is an instance 
of how there are public ‘criteria’ for the having of goals and beliefs (Wittgenstein, 
1958). The existence of these public criteria makes possible the empirical con­
firmation of attributions of goals and beliefs to a person. In addition, the order 
that is discernible among actions in the course of teleological explanation does not 
derive from classifying actions (behaviors) and displaying the members of the 
class as regularly following members of a class of antecedent events, as would be 
the case in law-like generalizations. The order derives instead from relating 
actions to goals, and it varies in richness depending on its capacity to display a 
wide variety, pattern, and sequence of actions as leading to the same goal. Since 
there is a kind of logical (‘criterial’) connection between the having of goals and 
beliefs and action, connections do not have to be defined in terms of regular 
successions of classes of events; teleological explanation can rest with unique 
descriptions of particular actions and still reflect order.
To challenge our argument about the limits of behaviorist explanation, it is
necessary to show that there are settings, beyond the boundary conditions we 
specified in our discussion of closed settings, in which behaviorist principles are 
clearly exemplified. One must show how the teleological framework, in which 
relations between explanatory factors and actions are ‘logical’ rather than causal, 
can be replaced by causal laws of the behaviorist research program.
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WHAT HUMAN BEINGS ARE
We have used the categories of teleological explanation, those that we use 
routinely to illuminate most of practical life, in order to define positively the 
boundaries of the explanatory power of behaviorist principles, and our mode of 
argument has involved sociological and historical analysis. Although our analysis 
is not ‘scientific’, in the sense in which science is conceived as involving the 
representation of phenomena as lawful, it serves the indispensible scientific fac­
tion of defining the limits or boundary conditions of known generalizations^ Our 
procedure is not ad hoc, it is entirely appropriate in the light of the kind of beings 
that humans are. To conclude, we will briefly outline our conception of human 
beings, contrasting it with the general conception of radical behaviorism.
Like behaviorists, we regard the analysis of the relation between persons and 
the environment as essential for understanding human behavior. Unlike them, we 
deny that this relation can be captured in a set of regularities involving behavior 
and environmental variables, except in closed settings. Characteristically, the 
relation between a person and the environment is mediated by the person s 
interpretation (perceptions, beliefs) of the environment, and intentions with 
respect to modifying it. Interpretations and intentions may be thought to be the 
province of cognitive psychologists. But they, like behaviorists, are normally m 
search of laws, and we do not believe that interpretations are any more lawful 
than actions are in open settings (see Fodor, 1983, for a supporting argument). 
Consequently, except in closed settings, human behavior is marked by variabih y
and a certain novelty. _
Affirming the explanatory significance and indispensibihty of interpretations
and intentions does not diminish the importance of the environment. The en­
vironment is both a constraint on behavior and the object of behavior. It limits 
what it is possibile to do, and what can be. done is always a modification of the 
environment (never the product of ‘pure volition’). Modification of the environ­
ment is the explicit object of intentions; virtually all acts presuppose a inultiphcity 
of environmental conditions, and all acts are expressed m a material medium. 
Beyond this we also maintain that the very obtaining of behavioral regularities 
depends upon the presence of certain environmental conditions (broad socio­
economic structures that convert many settings into closed ones). On this view 
different regularities may obtain within different socio-economic structures, so 
that the obtaining of regularities has an essential and inelimmable historicity, and 
requires a social-historical analysis for its explanation. When regularities are 
detached from socio-economic structures, human nature comes to be viewed as 
identical with its manifestation in the particular socio-historical locale m which it 
is being examined. Psychological inquiry dissociated from history always runs the 
risk of this misidentification.
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In other ways, too, we emphasize the social and historical character of human 
action. Human beings are social beings. What they do reflects their social posi­
tions and social roles, and much of what they do is directed toward generating and 
maintaining various kinds of social relations. Much deliberation about what to do 
concerns what is possible and appropriate given one’s social position and role, 
and the positions and roles to which one can reasonably aspire. The explanation 
of a person’s goals involves locating that person in the social nexus. The social 
nexus in turn requires that the person participate in certain practices, or be 
subjected to certain controls. Compare, for example, the role of professor in a 
psychology department, which requires participation in the practice of scientific 
research, with that of a worker earning piece rates in a factory, which requires 
performing tasks set by management in accordance with schedules controlled by 
management.
Within a practice such as scientific research, goals are understood in terms of 
their appropriateness given the current state of development of a particular 
research program — whether, for example, the research in question contributes to 
solving an outstanding problem, to refuting a rival hypothesis, to exploring a 
significant new phenomenon, to confirming a prediction that was generated by a 
theory, and so on. What it makes sense to do at one time is often quite different 
from what it makes sense to do at another. To understand why a researcher 
performs a particular experiment, one needs to locate its relevance to the histor­
ical unfolding of the research program. Actions that derive from practices become 
fully articulated only in teleological and historical terms.
Within a practice, goal-setting is not merely an individual matter, for judg­
ments of appropriateness ultimately involve the collective wisdom of the body of 
practitioners, and novices are apprenticed into the practice in the context of this 
collective authority. So proposed goals may be varied, challenged, and changed. 
Goals may be changed for various reasons, for example, conditions for realizing 
the goal (funding, outlets for publication) may be removed. Paradigmatically, 
however, within a practice goals are changed because of criticism, argument, the 
presentation of evidence — in general, through participation in dialogue. How the 
practice develops is crucially the outcome of this dialogue among the practition­
ers, and so a practice develops appropriate social relations among its members to 
facilitate and enhance such dialogue. In contrast, dialogue among the members of 
the work-force is essentially irrelevant to the setting of goals in a closed setting 
like the factory, and social relations that facilitate control rather than dialogue are 
thus developed.
There has always been a moral impulse behind Skinner’s driven and unrelent­
ing commitment to behaviorism, a belief that the implementation of systematic 
behavioral controls will contribute quickly to solving the big social problems of 
the modern world (Skinner, 1971). And much of his philosophical writing has 
been devoted to arguing that persons are the kind of beings defined by relations of 
control. We too have a moral motive. It is that relations of dialogue in all aspects 
of life are better for everyone than relations of control. So it is important for us to 
take as the appropriate objects of psychological inquiry persons who are capable 
of rich, dialogical relations, and to give an empirical basis to the claim that 
settings in which relations of control dominate are products of historically contin­
gent socio-economic structures. We have tried to do so here, and to suggest that
176 The Explanatory Power of Radical Behaviorism
human beings are what the explanatory scheme with the greatest comprehensive­
ness — the teleological scheme — says they are, and that where they appear to be 
otherwise, important features of humanity have been suppressed.
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